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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ACTS
(Continued from the November issue).
We have seen that the first characteristic of negotiability,
the right to sue the bailee on the contract in one's own
name, is not the real distinction under the acts between
negotiation and transfer, the only difference in this regard
being that this right follows immediately upon negotiation
of a document but only arises after notice to the bailee in
case the transaction is a transfer. The second distinction
is of much greater importance. The bailor may have defrauded the bailee, as by misrepresenting the character or
quantity of the goods bailed. A document may be purchased from one who secured it from a prior owner by fraud,
duress or mistake, or the seller of a document may have
found or stolen it or the document may have been issued to
one who found or stole the -goods. In some of these cases
the purchaser is protected if the transaction -was a negotiation and not if it was merely a transfer. In others the
purchaser loses even though the transaction was a negotiation. Let us see what the Acts say as to the effect of negotiation as conferring greater rights than those possessed
by the original holder or by later holders. First, negotiation differs from transfer in its effect upon the obligations of the bailee. "The holder in due course of a negotia-
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ble contract can rely on the form of the instrument as telling the whole story, provided the form of the instrument
has not been altered before it comes to his hands." Williston on Commercial Law, § 247, p. 133. Accordingly, Sec.
83 of the Sales Act, Sec. 41 of the Warehouse Receipts Act
and Sec. 32 of the Bills of Lading Act, all provide that one
to whom a document has been negotiated can hold the bailee
according to the terms of the document. The bailee cannot
set up the wrong of the depositor or shipper. The effect
of transfer is not the same. Sec. 24 of the Sales Act and
Sec. 42 of the Warehouse Receipts Act hold the bailee "according to the terms of the document" after notice from
the transferee. But the Bills of Lading Act contains a different provision, (ec. 33). Notice to the carrier makes
the transferee "the direct obligee of whatever obligations
the carrier owed to the transferor of the bill immediately
before the notification." Therefore, if one consigns goods
to himself, and by fraudulently misrepresenting the nature
of the goods, secures a bill misdescribing them, the carrier
may avoid liability for the failure of the goods to correspond to the description, for such liability, under Sec. 23,
arises only when the "consignee gave value in good faith
relying upon the description" in the bill. As the transferee
of a straight bill is given no greater right than the transferor had, the carrier has a good defence even as against
him. Surely the provisions of the Sales Act and of the
Warehouse Receipts Act are preferable, for an innocent
purchaser should always be able to rely on the representations of the document but the rule as to bills of lading -follows the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable
contracts and the Sales Act must be read in the light of this
provison of the Bills of Lading Act.
But the most important difference in effect between
negotiation and transfer has to do with the title acquired by
the one to whom the document is negotiated or transferred.
If the document is negotiable, its form is regarded as definitely showing the title. He to whose order the goods are
deliverable is taken to have title or at least authority to
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transfer title.
By this we mean authority from the depositor or shipper. If the latter stole the goods, the bona
fide purchaser of a document gets nothing, regardless of
the form of the document. In re Dreuil & Co., 205 Fed. 568.
This is true of all defects of title existng prior to the deposit or shipment of the goods, except such defects as affect only the equitable title. If the shipper or depositor
had a good legal title but one voidable for fraud, as this defect would be cured by a sale of the goods to a bona fide purchaser, a sale of a document representing them would
have the same effect and this regardless of the negotiable
or non-negotiable form of the document. But when the
depositor or shipper has a perfect title but someone secures
possession of the document by fraud or conversion, all
will depend upon the negotiable form of the document, when
the question arises as to the rights of an innocent purchaser from the wrongdoer. All the acts agree that the
transfer of a, straight document passes such title to the
goods as the transferor had, but if he in fact rwas to hold the
goods subject to the orders of the depositor or shipper, the
transferee would hold subject to this limitation. Though
the acts are silent on the subject, it seems that if the transferor was a purchaser of the goods but because of fraud,
had only a voidable title, a transferee who bought for value
and without notice of the fraud, would take a good title to
the goods. The transferor of a straight document is in
possession of the goods, in legal contemplation, and the
same effect should be given to a sale when the goods are
in the hands of a bailee as when they are in the hands of
the seller himself. Therefore, if a transferor has a title
to the goods which he has ability to convey to a bona fide
purchaser for value, the transferee will take a good title.
When we said above that, if the document is negotiable, its form is regarded as definitely showing the title, we
said what is true of bills of exchange, promissory notes,
stock certificates and bills of lading. It is only partially
true of warehouse receipts. Sec. 32 of the Sales Act provides who may make an effective negotiation of a docu-
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ment. He must either be the owner or the one to whose
order the goods are deliverable or the document must be
in form to be negotiated without indorsement and he must
have been "entrusted with the possession or custody of the
document." Sec. 40 of the Warehouse Receipts Act makes
exactly the same provision. But the Transfer of Stock
Act and the Bills of Lading Act contain very different provisions. Sec. 5 of the Transfer of Stock Act provides that
one in possession of a certificate, properly indorsed, may
transfer title, though he had no right of possession nor
any authority from the owner or the one named in the certificate as owner or any later indorser. A thief or a finder
of the certificate can give a good title. Of course conversion 'by one entrusted with the possession or custody of
the certificate does not impair the title of the purchaser.
-See. 31 of the Bills of Lading Act similarly provides
that a'bill may be negotiated by any person in possession of
it, however such possession may have been acquired, if -the
one negotiating it was the consignee or it is already properly indorsed by the one to whose order the goods are deliverable. It is to be regretted that warehouse receipts still
lack that degree of negotiability possessed by all other ne.
gotiable instruments.
The Sales Act must of course be
read in the light of the Bills of Lading Act and its provision must be applied only to warehouse receipts.
If the
document is not negotiable, the owner may safely entrust
it to anyone and if it is lost or stolen from him, he has
only lost his evidence of his contract with the bailee. One
who has converted a straight document can pass no better
title than that which he himself has and that is none. The
same is of course true in the case of negotiable documents
when any of the indorsements thereon are forgeries. The
document itself and all indorsements must be genuine. This
risk that a negotiable document may be forged or altered
"has in practice proved the most serious risk of all."
(Williston's Lectures on Commercial Law, Sec. 179, p. 98).
Forgery is easy because of the carelessness with which receipts and bills of lading are made out. Warehouse re-
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ceipts are now required to have a serial number but this
i- not true of bills of lading. Great precautions are usually taken in the case of stock certificates and forgery of a
certificate is very difficult. It is stamped, punched and
countersigned. See Trust Co. v. R. R. Co., 237 Pa. 519.
The difference in the law relating to receipts and bills
in regard to the title that may be given by a thief or a
finder is further indicated by a comparison of Sec. 38 of the
Sales Act and Sec. 38 of the Warehouse Receipts Act with
Sec. 38 of the Bills of Lading Act. The first two provide
that the negotiation shall be effective though it involved a
"breach of duty" by the one negotiating it, and though the
owner was "induced by fraud, mistake or duress to entrust
it" to the wrongdoer.
The Bills of Lading Act says all
this and adds that the negotiation shall be effective though
the owner "was deprived of the possession by accident or
conversion." This clearly covers lost and stolen bills, while
the purchaser of a lost or stolen receipt gets nothing. Sec.
6 of the Stock Transfer Act contains provisions not found
in any of the other acts. Instead of the fraud, duress or
mistake being used to induce the owner to entrust the document to the wrongdoer, they may have been used to secure the indorsement. Does this impair the title of a purchaser? The Transfer of Stock Act provides that the
indorsement is effectual though it was induced by fraud,
duress or mistake. After indorsement of a document and
its delivery to an agent for sale, the owner may revoke the
authority to dispose of it, or the law may revoke the power
as the result of the death of the owner or his insanity occurring after indorsement.
Subsequent disposal by an agent
under such circumstances would be a conversion but of
the kind described in the acts as a "breach of duty" and
the purchaser of any negotiable document is protected. This
is left to inference in all the acts except the Transfer of
Stock Act. Secs. 6 and 7 of said act expressly so provide.
The owner, to be protected, must reclaim his certificate and
forestall the wrongful disposal of it and it is further pro-
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vided that even this right may be lost by laches in seeking
to enforce it.
There is still another risk which the purchaser of a
document runs. The indorsement may be genuine but the
party making it may have lacked legal capacity or authority to make the indorsement. The indorser may have been
an infant, a lunatic, an habitual drunkard, or a trustee, executor or administrator or other fiduciary without authority
in the instrument creating the trust to convert securities.
The uniform acts do not diminish at all this risk. It is so
provided in Sec. 2 of the Stock Transfer Act, but is left to
inference in the other acts. All the acts provide that in
cases not covered by them, "the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to the law of principal and agent, executors, administrators and trustees, and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other
invalidating cause, shall govern." (See. 73 of Sales Act,
Sec. 18 of Stock Transfer Act, Sec. 56 of Warehouse Receipts Act and Sec. 51 of Bills of Lading Act).
Defects of Title Antedating the Document
We have still to consider the position of one who buys
a document perfect in itself but which was issued for goods
wrhich were converted by the bailor at or before the time
the bailment was created. Or again the deposit or shipment
of the goods may constitute a violation of the rights of a
mortgagee or lienholder. It is obvious that the law could
not enable one who has found or stolen goods to place himself in a position to pass a good title to them merely by
resorting to the expedient of placing them in storage or in
transit and taking a negotiable receipt or bill for them.
Sec. 43 of the Bills of Lading Act covers such cases. Sec.
42 provides that the seller's lien and right to stop in transit shall be lost if the buyer negotiates a bill for the goods.
Sec. 43 provides that any other lien which exists on gooas
prior to their delivery to the carrier may be enforced even
against the purchaser of a negotiable bill representing
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them, provided the lien would not have been lost had the
goods themselves been the subject of the transaction, without any document of title being involved. Therefore, one
who buys a negotiable document of title runs the risk, not
only that the bailor may have found or stolen the goods
but also that he may have received them from the owner
under a contract of lease with only an option to buy and
See. 33 of the
that he has not yet fully paid for them.
Act and
Receipts
Warehouse
of
the
41
See:
Sales Act,
in
providing
all
alike
Sec. 32 of the Bills of Lading Act are
that the negotiation of a document passes only the title
which the person negotiating it had or had ability to convey to a bona fide purchaser and the title of the original
parties to the document. If none of them had title, the
purchaser gets none. All three acts say it is enough if
the one to whose order the goods were to be delivered had
title or ability to convey title to a bona fide purchaser. The
Warehouse Receipts Act adds that negotiation also passes
the depositor's title and the Bills of Lading Act says the
Curiously the Sales Act
same of the consignor's title.
makes no reference to the bailor's title but again this act
must be read in the light of the other acts. The omission
was evidently inadvertent.
Warranties on the Sale of a Document
The existence of the risks just mentioned and the absence of any warranty on the part of the bailee that any
party to the document had title to the goods make it important to a purchaser to know what recourse he has
against prior indorsers. See. 37 of the Sales Act, See. 45
of the Warehouse Receipts Act and See. 36 of the Bills of
Lading Act all provide that indorsement shall not make
the indorser liable for any failure on the part of the bailee
who issued the document or previous indorsers thereof to
fulfill their respective obligations. Indorsement is simply
a necessary incident of negotiation. If the bailee does not
honor the document upon presentation, the holder of an
indorsed document of title cannot have recourse to the in-
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dorser, as could the holder of a draft or a note. Though,
as stated, no liability attaches to an indorser as such, anyone who disposes of a document, (whether negotiable or
not), to another for value, including one who assigns for
value a claim secured by a document, unless a contrary intention appears, does make certain warranties. This is
provided by Sec. 36 of the Sales Act, Sec. 11 of the Stock
Transfer Act, Sec. 44 of the Warehouse Receipts Act and
Sec. 35 of the Bills of Lading Act. Three of the warranties named are found in all of the acts. They are these:
First, that the document is genuine; second, that he has a
right to dispose of the document; and third, that he is ignorant of any fact which would impair the validity or worth
of the document. Therefore, if one only deals with responsible parties, he has a remedy if the document be forged or
altered, or if the one from whom he purchased had neither
title to the document nor authority to dispose of it. This
latter is only important in the case of warehouse receipts
or straight documents, for negotiation would cure defects
of title in the other cases and the prior owner would have
to proceed against the wrongdoer. If the document has no
goods behind it, the holder's only remedy is against the
bailee, unless he can prove that the seller had knowledge
of the -facts. The Sales Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act
and the Bills of Lading Act all contain a further warranty,
namely, that the one disposing of the document had the
right to transfer title to the goods and such other warranties as are implied in sales of goods. This gives the purchaser his remedy in case the goods were lost or stolen before they were deposited or shipped. The Stock Transfer
Act and the Bills of Lading Act contain a further provision not found in the Sales Act or the Warehouse Receipts
Act, though it should be in all the acts. It is this: "In the
case of the assignment of a claim secured by a certi-ficate of stock or by a bill of lading, the liability of the assignor shall not exceed the amount of the claim."
The
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omission from the other acts must have been inadvertent
and it must be read into the Sales Act from the Bills of
Lading Act.
Accepting Payment of a Debt
It is a disputed question as to whether a bank which
discounts a draft, taking a bill of lading as security, succeeds to the liability of the seller of the goods, in case the
buyer, after paying the draft, finds the bill of lading to
be forged, or the -goods not to be of the character described
in the bill. The bank is not an assignee of a claim secured
by a document and so within the provisions of the sections
just referred to, it is merely accepting payment of a debt.
See Williston on Sales, p. 745. However, the cases are sufficiently close to have led to a further provision in the
Stock Transfer Act, Sec. 12; the Warehouse Receipts Act,
Sec. 46 and the Bills of Lading Act, Sec. 37. But, curiously, there is no such provision in the Sales Act. The other
acts all provide that, "a mortgagee or pledgee or other holder of a document for security who in good faith demands
or receives payment of the debt for which such document
is security, whether from a party to a draft drawn for such
debt or ifrom any other person, shall not be deemed to represent or to warrant the genuineness of the document or
the quantity or quality of the goods therein described or the
'alue of the shares represented by a certificate of stock."
Again, it would seem that this omission from the Sales Act
was inadvertent and the provisions of the other acts must
be read into it. Williston on Sales, § 281.
How to Ship Goods to a Buyer
Sometimes neither party to a sale of goods cares to
trust the other. The seller wants to retain his hold on the
goods till paid and the buyer does not want to pay till he
gets the goods. How can this be done? Secs. 40 of the
Bills of Lading Act and 19 and 20 of the Sales Act give the
answer. A seller may ship the goods in any of four ways:
1st, by straight bill naming the buyer or his agent as consignee; 2nd, by an order bill to the buyer or his agent; 3d,
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by straight bill, naming himself as consignee; 4th, by an
order bill to himself or his agent. By naming the buyer
as consignee, the seller indicates his intent to pass the title
to the buyer when the goods are shipped, whether the bill
be a straight bill or an order bill. But since the buyer cannot get his goods till he gets an order bill, the seller retains his hold on the goods until he surrenders such a bill.
But by naming the buyer as consignee, the seller has put
himself in an awkward position. If the buyer refuses to
pay on tender of the bill of lading and also refuses to indorse the bill of lading back to the seller, the carrier will
hold the goods until it is convinced that the consignee has
no interest in the goods.
By naming himself or his agent as consignee the seller
indicates his intent to retain title. In order to indicate his
intention to appropriate the goods to a definite buyer, he
may insert in the bill the words, "Notify A. B.," that is, the
buyer. But for the form of the bill, the title would have
passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, and as this
form is used only because it is necessary to compel payment
by the buyer, the acts place upon the buyer the risks of
ownership, just as if the goods had been consigned to him.
Sec. 9 of the Bills of Lading Act provides that the presence
in the bill of the words, "Notify A. B." shall not affect the
negotiability of the bill nor be notice to a later purchaser
of the bill of any rights or equities of the original buyer.
Therefore, when the goods are shipped in this way, the
buyer has all the burdens of ownership without any of its
advantages. The seller can change his mind and sell the
goods to another and the buyer has only his action against
the seller personally, unless the second buyer knew of the
equitable title of the first buyer.
Frequently the seller draws a draft on the buyer for
the price and sends the draft with the bill of lading attached either to his own agent or to the buyer direct. He often discounts the draft at his home bank and the bank then
forwards the draft, with the bill attached, to its correspondent bank in the buyer's city to present the draft for ac-
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ceptance or payment. The seller has indorsed the bill in
blank, so that, if the buyer does not honor the draft, the
bank can sell the bill of lading or fall back on the drawer of
the draft and return the bill of lading. But suppose the
seller sends the draft and bill, indorsed in blank, to the
buyer direct, and the buyer uses the bill but does not honor
the draft, is an innocent purchaser of the goods in the same
position as if he had bought goods from a thief? Both
acts provide that, whether the buyer gets the goods from
the carrier and sells them or negotiates the bill of lading,
the innocent purchaser shall be protected, though, of course,
the buyer has committed a conversion. The case is treated
just as a delivery to a buyer under a contract of conditional
sale is treated in Pennsylvania. The foregoing rules as to
the intention of the seller to be inferred from the form
of the bill of lading are absolute as to third parties but as
between the seller and the buyer, it may always be shown
that the contract of the parties made a different provision
as to when title was to pass.
The Warehouse Receipts Act and the Stock Transfer
Act contain no provisions similar to the foregoing provisions of the Sales Act and the Bills of Lading Act, but one
sElling goods to remain in storage or one selling shares of
stock may use a draft with the negotiable document attached in the same way and the same rules would be applied.
Duty of Bailee When Converted Goods Are Bailed
When the one entitled to the goods by the terms of a
document of title demands the goods, may the bailee decline to deliver the goods on the ground that the title of
the bailor was defective and that delivery would expose the
bailee to an action for conversion at the suit of the real
owner? Sec. 11 of the Bills of Lading Act casts the burden on the carrier of proving the existence of a lawful excuse for non-delivery.
Sec. 8 of the Warehouse Receipts
Act contains a like provision but adds that the excuse must
be one provided by the act itself. See. 12 of the Bills of
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Lading Act and See. 9 of the Warehouse Receipts Act both
provide that it shall be a good excuse for non-delivery if
the bailee has already surrendered the goods to one who was
entitled to their possession, that is, the one whose goods
were converted by the bailor. On the other hand, the same
sections protect the bailee if he has delivered the goods to
the one entitled by the document before he learned of the
claims of the one whose goods were converted. The act
of storing or carrying the goods and redelivering them to
the wrongdoer or another at his behest is no longer a tort,
if the bailee acted innocently in the matter. But if the
bailee has information of the claim of the real owner but
is in doubt as to the validity of his alleged rights, what is
he to do? Sec. 10 of the Warehouse Receipts Act and
Sec. 13 of the Bills of Lading Act make the bailor liable, if
it makes a mistaken delivery in such a case. If he delivers to the one appearing to be entitled by the terms of the
document, he is liable to the real owner, if the latter had
requested him not to make such delivery or if the bailee
had information from any source that such person was not
entitled to the goods. On the other hand, if he undertakes
to deliver to the claimant, he must be able to show that his
claim was well founded. But one agent of a carrier may
be delivering goods at the very time notice of the prior conversion is being given to another agent. Accordingly the
above section protects the carrier unless there has been a
reasonable time for the agent knowing the facts to communicate with the agent in actual control of the goods, and unless the notice was received by an agent whose apparent
duty it was to act upon it. Sec. 18 of the Warehouse Receipts Act and Sec. 21 of the Bills of Lading Act give the
bailee a reasonable time to determine the validity of such
claims of which it has notice, and in the meantime it may
justify retention of the goods as against both claimants.
After the lapse of such a time it must act at its peril or begin legal proceedings to compel the different claimants to
interplead. The right of a bailee to call on his bailor to
interplead has been denied, hence See. 17 of the Warehouse
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Receipts Act and Sec. 20 of the Bills of Lading Act expressly give this remedy to the bailee, either as a defense to an
action or as an original proceeding. The Sales Act casts
no light on this question because no sale is involved in it.
And as shares of stock are intangible and only the certificate can be converted, the Stock Transfer Act contains no
relevant provisions. But a corporation may be met by adverse claims to the ownership of a certificate and it would
be justified in retaining dividends till the validity of the
claims was decided, and interpleader would be the only appropriate remedy.
CriminalOffenses
The Sales Act and the Stock Transfer Act contain no
criminal provisions. The crimes created by the Warehouse
Receipts Act and those created by the Bills of Lading Act
are not the same, except in part. Both acts make it a crime
to issue a document with knowledge that the goods have
not actually been received at the time it is issued. If the
receiving agent deceives the issuing agent, the former only
is guilty. Similarly both acts make it criminal to issue a
document known, to contain any false statement. Again
both acts make it criminal to issue a second negotiable document, not marked "duplicate," while knowing the original
to be outstanding. The issue of new documents after judicial proceedings upon the loss or destruction of the original
is excepted in the Warehouse Receipts Act but not in the
Bills of Lading Act. The issue of a receipt by a warehouseman for goods in which he has an interest, which the receipt does not disclose is criminal.
This fraud has not
arisen in the case of carriers and the Bills of Lading Act
has no section covering it. Both acts make it criminal to
bail goods, the title to which the bailor knows is defective,
if he later negotiates a negotiable document representing
them without disclosing his defect of title. As previous:y stated, the Warehouse Receipts Act makes it a crime to
surrender goods for which a negotiable receipt is shown to
be outstanding, except in the case of a judicial decree upon
proof of the loss of the original. There is no such severe
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rule in the case of carriers, their civil liability being deemed sufficient. On the other hand, to issue a straight bill
of lading and not mark it "not negotiable," is made a crime
if done with intent to defraud. There is no similar provision in regard to warehouse receipts. The Bills of Lading
Act contains two further provisions not in the Warehouse
Receipts Act. It is made criminal to fraudulently dispose of
a bill knowing that there are no goods behind it and also to
secure the issuance of a fictitious bill by inducing the freight
agent to believe that the goods have been received by the
carrier.
'We have pointed out the many points of difference between these "Uniform Acts," in their provisions dealing
vith analogous situations. Is it not time for the Commissioners to begin the preparation of an act to unify these
acts and put these documents on exactly the same basis? It
would greatly reduce the labor of students and practitioners and the writer knows of no objection which could be
urged against such a course.
J. P. McKEEHAN.
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MOOT COURT
OAKMAN v. TORREY, ATCHISON et al.
Corporations-Partnerships-Defective Incorporation-Act of April
29, 1874, Sec. 3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Torrey and the other defendants obtained a charter from the
governor, as the Westmoreland Shoe Company; but they failed to record it in the county. As such company they have conducted business eand have bought goods to the value of $2000 from Oakman,
the plaintiff. Oakman sues them, not as a corporation, but as partners.
Leopold, for the plaintiff.
Krause, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MILLER, J. The plaintiff has sued the defendant company as
a partnership. The defendants maintain that they should have been
sued, not as a partnership but as a corporation; that the charter
of incorporation granted them by the state is a bar to a recovery in
this suit against them as partners.
On the other hand the plaintiff contends that the recordation of their certificate in the county
is a prerequisite essential to their existence as a corporation, and
that therefore, not being such corporation, they are a partnership.
As a corporation the assets of the company alone are liable for
the debts incurred by said company. As a partnership, a creditor
has recourse not only to the assets of the company, but if that prove
insufficient, also to the individual assets of its members. Naturally therefore the distinction here contended for is material and of
importance.
The Act of April 29, 1874, P. L. 73, § 3 regulates the manner of
incorporation of manufacturing concerns such as the defendant, and
provides as follows: "The said original certificate, with all of its
endorsements, shall then be recorded in the office for the recording
of deeds, in and for the county where the chief operations are to be
carried on, and from thenceforth the subscribers thereto, and their
associates and successors, shall be a corporaation for the purpose
and upon the terms named in the said charter."
The literal reading of the statute would seem to be quite conclusive against the defendants' contention that they are a valid subsisting corporation. The act says, "the certificate" shall "be recorded"..........
"and from thenceforth"..........
the association
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"shall be a corporation." For the reason of the difference as to
liability, it is obviously material that the public should .have notice
of the incorporation as prescribed in the act. The provision is clear,
precise, and simple. Certainly no one should be made to suffer loss
through failure to comply with the terms of this statute except those
whose negligence and apparent indifference as to the welfare of
the parties with whom they deal, have made injury possible. To
bold otherwise would be to open an avenue for a simple, but effectual fraud upon the business concerns of our state. Hence it has
been held both in this and other jurisdictions that the requirements in respect to filing of charters are imperative, and that the
acts relative thereto should be strictly construed. Guckert v. Hacke
et al., 159 Pa. 303; Bank v. Crowell, 177 Pa. 313; Pinkerton v. Traction Co., 193 Pa. 229; Manufacturing Co. v. Beale, 204 Pa. 85; Tonge
v. Item Publishing Co., 244 Pa. 417; Garnett v. Richardson, 35 Ark,
144; Abbott v. Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416; Ferris v. Thaw, 72 Mo. 446;
Childs v. Smith, 55 Barbour 45; Doyle v. Mizner, 42 Mich. 332.
The defendant contends on the authority of Spahr v. Bank, 94
Pa. 429, that the plaintiff having dealt with the defendant as a corporation, is estopped from denying their existence as a corporation
even though they failed to record their charter. From the facts as
stated there is no affirmative evidence that the plaintiff dealt with
the defendants as a corporation, and we certainly can not presume
that he did so. There is nothing -in the name of the defendants'
company which should have put the plaintiff upon inquiry, nor are
the methods pursued by corporations distinctive. Partnerships and
unincorporated societies frequently conduct their business upon
methods similar to those of corporations, and their organizations as
to officers, etc., may be identically alike. Moreover, even were it
affirmatively shown that the plaintiff had dealt with the company,
with knowledge of their incorporation, we doubt if the rule as laid
down in Spahr v. Bank, would be law today. The more recent authorities would seem to hold contra. In Tonge v. Item Publishing
Co., 244 Pa. 417, a judgment was recovered against the company as
a corporation and it was held that those conducting the business
were liable alone. The members having failed to record their certificate, the company was not a corporation, and that fact barred
levying an assessment upon the subscribers for their unpaid shares.
In Manufacturing 'Company v. Beale, 204 Pa. 85, the plaintiff recovHe was
ered a judgment against the company as a corporation.
later denied enforcing his judgment -n the ground that the nonrecordation of the certificates was sufficient notice to plaintiff
that they were not a corporation. Consequently, the company not being
a corporation under these circumstances, how can we impute knowledge to any plaintiff of the contrary, that it is a corporation?
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Moreover, the decision in Spahr v. Bank was made upon circumstances peculiar to the case. This point, however, being unnecessary
to the decision in the case at bar, we will not decide it.
In accordance with the authorities cited, justice, and right, we
hold that, having failed to record their certificate, the defendant
company is not a corporation, and that -its members are liable as
partners.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
There exists a striking conflict of authority as to the partnership liability of stockholders in corporations which are defectively organized. The conflict is well illustrated by the decisions in the
cases where the defect in the organization was the failure to file or
record the articles of incorporation in a certain public office. See
13 Ann. Cas. 1146; 17 L. R. A. 549; 30 Cyc- 399.
The view taken by many of the leading text writers is that the
Cook on Stock and
supposed stockholders are liable as partners.
Stockholders, 233; Beach on Private Corporations, 112; Spelling on
Private Corporations, 838. "According to these authorities, the requirement of the statutes that articles of incorporation shall be filed
in a certain public office falls within the class of mandatory provisions without compliance with which there is no incorporation, and
the coadventurers remain liable as partners." 10 Cyc. 658. To the
same effect is Thompson on Corporations, §§ 239, 2875.
The doctrine announced by these writers has been adopted by
the courts of Pennsylvania. Guckert v. Hacke, 159 Pa. 303; N. Y.
Bank v. Crowell, 177 Pa. 313; Braddock Boro v. Water Co., 189 Pa.
379; Pinkerton v. Traction Co., 193 Pa. 234; Keller v. Riverton Co.,
34 Super. 305; Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97; 6 I R. A.
(N. S.) 1009; 30 Cyc. 400.
The doctrine of Spahr v. Bank, 94 Pa. 429, is not applicable to
the present case. The burden of proof is on the party alleging and
relying on an estoppel to establish all the facts necessary to constitute it. 16 Cyc. 811.
The reasoning of the learned judge below sufficiently vindicates
the decision which the opinion enunciates.
Judgment affirmed.
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MERTON v. ALLISON
Negotiable Instruments-Principal and Surety-Subrogation
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Merton and Allison made a note for $300 payable to Frew in
three months. Merton was surety for Allison on the note. Allison,
without Merton's knowledge, begged for further time, and Frew,
in consideration of interest prepaid for three months, agreed to a
three months' extension. Subsequent to the expiration of this extended time, Merton, threatened with suit, paid the note, although he
knew of the agreement to extend time, and although he could have
defeated un action by alleging this extension. This is a suit against
Allison, the principal debtor, by the surety.
Baxter, for the plaintiff.
Bonen, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRUNER, J. It is a well settled rule of law that the payment
of interest in advance is sufficient consideration to support a contract for an extension of time to the principal so as to discharge the
surety. 32 Cyc. 2027, and cases cited. The agreement between Frew
and Allison furnished Merton with a valid and sufficient defense to
an action on the note. Could he, Merton, by paying the note, recover
the sum paid from the maker? With what intent did he pay the
note; in his capacity as surety, or as a purchaser?
Was it as a purchaser for value? If so, Merton became a holder
in due course for value, and under section 57 of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1901, he would hold "the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available to
prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the
instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable
thereon." If the case at bar could be decided upon this point alone,
judgment would have to be for the plaintiff.
But whether the payment of the debt was a purchase depends
primarily upon the intent of the parties at the time the transaction
takes place. It is prima facie a purchase. Burke's Appeal, 95 Pa.
145; Brown v. Marmaduke, 248 Pa. 247; 7 Cyc. 1025. What was
Merton's intention? Frew, after the note became due, threatened
Merton, the surety, with suit. The latter, now cognizant of the extension which had been granted without his knowledge or consent,
paid the note, although he could have defeated an action by alleging
this extension. These are the only facts with which the record furnishes us. In our opinion they are not sufficient to make Merton,

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

81

prima facie, a purchaser for value of the instrument. Is it not more
reasonable to suppose that he, desirous of keeping out of litigation,
paid the sum due as an interested party, namely, as surety?
Allison, the maker of the note, and the defendant in this case,
relies upon this ground. He claims that Merton, by the payment
of the note, has extinguished the debt voluntarily, and not as a purchaser for value. If this is true, is there no legal obligation resting upon Allison to repay Merton? There is certainly a moral obligation. And there is at least an implied contract between the parties which obliges a principal to reimburse his surety when the latter has paid the debt. 32 Cyc. 250. Is subrogation of the surety
against the principal to be defeated by the fact that the surety could
avail himself of a perfect defense against the creditor, by reason of
the extension of time to the principal by the creditor without the
knowledge or consent of the surety at the time the extension is
granted? Cannot the surety waive his defenses? We are of the
opinion that he can. To quote: A surety can waive his defense,
such as that an extension of time has been given to the principal.
32 Cyc. 163, and cases cited; 7 Cyc. 887. In Hinds v. Ingham, 31 fI1.
400, the surety, with the knowledge of the extension, paid a part of
the note, and promised to pay the balance. The learned Court in
its opinion held that this was a waiver on the part of the surety of
his discharge by an extension.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Brown v. Marmaduke,
248 Pa. 247, has said: "The fact that the payment of a promissory
note has been extended without the consent of the surety is a defense for the benefit of the surety, the use of which is optional on
his part." In that case both makers of a judgment note, one a principal and the other a surety, died before the amount was paid. Later
the widow of the principal paid the amount of the note to the payee
The widow then
and the note was thereupon delivered to her.
brought suit on the note against the executors of the surety and recovered. The case reported in 248 Pa. 247 was a subsequent action
by the executors of the surety against the widow, as executrix of the
principal, to recover the amount of the judgment. Although the
facts in Brown v. Marmaduke are not similar to the facts in the case
at bar, yet the opinion of the Court, quoted above, is sufficient, we
believe, to point out the probable decision if the present case were to
be presented for their adjudication.
If the surety can waive his defenses, and thus be subrogated to
the creditor, and we believe he can, we fail to see any ground upon
which the defendant is deserving of judgment. Mere moral obligation alone would decree that the maker of the note should not so
easily escape liability for its payment. And above this is the law.
If Merton is to be considered a purchaser for value, he can recover;
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if he is to be regarded as having acted as surety on the note, he can
waive his defenses, and still recover. Judgment must be for the
plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below has sustained the plaintiff's action on
the ground that the plaintiff, as a purchaser of the note, could enforce it. But he is not attempting to enforce it. Apparently he is a
joint maker of the note, and to sue on it would be to sue himself. This
he cannot do at law.
This suit is necessarily based on his having paid money on behalf of
the defendant which the latter should in equity repay to him. When
he became a surety, there was a duty put on Allison to repay him,
should he pay under legal compulsion the note which represented
Allison's debt. The question before us is, was Allison under a duty
tc repay Merton, if Merton paid the debt, whether under legal compulsion or not? We think he was. Had Merton not paid Frew, Frew
could have compelled Allison to pay him. The invitation to Merton
to become a surety was, we think, an authority to -him to pay Frew,
so long as Allison continued liable, and not barely an authority to
pay Frew, so long as he, Merton, continued liable.
Affirmed.
PHILLIPS v. MOUNTMORRIS
Evidence-Modification of Written Instrument by Parol TestimonyBill of Sale
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Phillips sold a horse by a bill of sale calling for $250 as the
price. He sues for the price of the horse, or $350, and offers the
bill of sale and parol evidence that for a reason specified the defendant wished $100 omitted from the price, promising however to pay
$350 in spite of the mention in the bill of $250 only. The defendant
is willing and offers to pay $250, but objects to the modification of
the writing by the parol evidence. The court admitted this evidence,
and the order is for $350 plus interest.
Dunn, for the appellant.
Clark, for the appellee.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
FARRELL, J. We consider that the question to be decided in
this case is whether parol contemporaneous evidence is admissible to
contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument, in this
case, a bill of sale.
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The general rule is that when any judgment of any court, or
any other judicial or official proceeding, or any grant or other disposition of property, or any contract, agreement, or understanding
has been reduced to writing, and is evidenced by a document or serieS
of documents, the contents of such documents cannot be contradieted,
altered, added to or varied by parol or extrinsic evidence. The r]ule
is a necessary one because of the obvious fact that written instruments would soon come to be of little value if their explicit provisions could be varied, controlled or superseded by such evidence;
and it is also plain that a different rule would greatly increase the
temptations to commit perjury.
Bills of sale or sales notes, by the great weight of authority, are
placed on the same footing as other written instruments, with respect to their being varied by the admission of parol evidence, and
it is therefore held that such instruments cannot be varied, added to,
contradicted or explained by parol evidence. In so far as a bill of
sale partakes of the nature of a receipt or is simply declaratory of
a fact, it may be explained or perhaps contradicted; but to the extent
that it expresses the contract of the parties, and defines their rights
and liabilities, it is subject to the same rule as other written contracts and precludes the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence.
The rule in Pennsylvania is that parol evidence is allowed to
contradict or vary instruments, (1) where there was fraud, ae'iident
or mistake in the creation of the instrument itself, and (2) where
there has been an attempt to make a fraudulent use of the instrument, in violation of a promise or agreement made at the time the instrument was signed, and without which it would not have been executed. This is supported by Phillips v. Meily, in 106 Pa. 536, per
Paxson, J. It is clear that the present case does not fall within these
exceptions. It was written just as both parties wished it to be written. There was nothing omitted. Can a party to a contract receive
more than the contract price merely because he says it was verbally
agreed he was to receive more? Surely this would be a very unjust
rule.
In the recent case of Potter v. Grimm, 248 Pa. 440, there is a
very learned dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart in which he says
that in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake parol evidence Is
not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument.
The learned counsel for the appellee bases his argument primarily upon the case of Croyle v. The Cambria Land and Improvement
Co., 233 Pa. 310. In that case there was an omission not contemplated by the parties, but which happened through the mistake of the
scriviner. When the omission was discovered, the party prejudiced
by it refused to sign the paper as written. He was induced to sign
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it by the other party's promising to make good what had been
omitted. The case was thus brought clearly within the established
exceptions to the rule that excludes parol testimony when offered
to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument. In this case
there is no equity shown to bring it within any recognized exception.
In Renshaw v. Gans, 7 Pa. 117, parol evidence was admitted because the case fell under one of the exceptions, mistake.
Here nothing was omitted from the written contract that was
ever intended to be inserted in it; neither fraud, accident or mistake
is alleged in connection with the written articles and for this reason
it was error to allow parol evidence to alter their terms. The parol
promise set up was no part of the written contract, but an independent undertaking for which the consideration was the written agreement, and for which a separate action would lie.
We therefore think that the parol evidence should not have been
admitted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The bill of sale which was signed by the purchaser, the defendmentions $250 as the price to be paid for the horse. The offer
to show that the price agreed to be paid was $350, and that it
stated in the bill to be only $250 on the request of the defendant,
assigned a particular reason for making it.
There was, as the learned court below says, no fraud, accident,
or mistake in the composing of the bill. Both parties knew that it
named $250 as the price. There was no accident in making it name
this price. The designation of $250 was solicited by the defendant,
and acceded to by the plaintiff. There was no mistake. The writing
exactly corresponded with what the parties intended it to contain.
But, if the evidence is believed, the vendor consented to execute the bill, with $250 mentioned as the price, only at the request of
the vendee, and upon his promise to pay $350. It would be a fraud
for the vendee to refuse to pay more than $250, because, he having
procured the writing on his promise to pay $350, the smaller sum was
written in the bill.
There may have been no fraudulent purpose, in Mountmorris,
when he signed the bill, and induced Phillips to sign it. But why
should a difference be made between the effect of a fraudulent purpose existing when the bill was drawn, and a fraudulent purpose subsequently formed? To use the bill now to defeat the recovery of
more than $250 is to use it fraudulently. Says Stewart, J. in Croyle
v. Land & Improvement Co., 233 Pa. 310, "The English rule in its
strictness would exclude all evidence of the promise, (e. g. to pay the
ant,
was
was
who
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additional $100) notwithstanding a subsequent refusal by defendant,
to observe its promise, while holding on to what is obtained by reason
of it, would be quite as much a fraud on the plaintiff as any wilful
suppression or misrepresentation of fact in connection with the making of the instrument."
Whether statutes of fraud have lessened the amount of successful fraud, no man knows. There was no statute requiring this
sale to be in writing. Why should the courts invent a rule requiring that, if any part of a transaction is reduced to writing, the whole
of it shall be; or if an averment with respect to price is made, that
it shall be conclusively assumed exactly to correspond with the price
agreed upon? It has long been held that prices mentioned in deeds
for land, may be shown by parol to be different from the price actually agreed to be paid and paid. Acknowledgments in deeds of the
receipt of purchase money may be contradicted.
That the parties may desire to express but a part of their agreement in writing is evident. Why should the courts arbitrarily prohibit their doing so; or, the same thing, determine that only the part
expressed in writing should be regarded?
We are aware of the hopeless contradiction among the decisions,
and Potter v. Grimm, 248 Pa. 440, illustrates the regrettable unsteadiness of the attitude of the courts on this important subject.
We think the evidence was properly admitted, and the judgment
of the Superior Court must be reversed.
Reversed.

ROPER, ADMR. OF JEFFERSON v. HARRINGTON
I'raudulent Conveyance-Statute of 13th Elizabeth-Remedy in Equity
Rockmaker, for plaintiff.
Rosenberg, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHELLEY, J. The petition sets forth that Jefferson, insolvent,
conveyed his farm to Harrington for $5000. The farm was worth no
wore. Harrington was aware that Jefferson was selling the farm
in order to withdraw it from the reach of his creditors, but Harrington was not induced to any extent to make the purchase by the desire to assist Jefferson in effecting his object. Jefferson has died
and his administrator, Roper, filed this bill to have the conveyance
to Harrington declared void. The existing debts would consume all
the property of Jefferson and the total value of the farm.
Under the Statute of 13th Elizabeth, which is the law of Penn-
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sylvania at the present time in regard to Fraudulent Conveyances,
(Davis v. Bigler, 62 Pa. 242), a conveyance in fraud of creditors can
he assailed only by the creditors, and it is valid as to all other parties. Clark v. Douglass, 62 Pa. 408. Respondent claims, therefore,
that Roper, as administrator of Jefferson, is not the proper party
to bring this suit. In so claiming he overlooks a very important
principle of law, which is that the executor or administrator is the
trustee for the distributees and creditors; and here, as the estate is
insolvent and there will be no distributees, he is the trustee solely for
the creditors, and, consequently, he is the proper party to bring the
action for the benefit of the said creditors.
Returning to the Statute of 13th Elizabeth, we see that as early
as 1602 in the celebrated 'Twynes Case," the Statute was construed
to exempt those conveyances which were made for a good or valuable
consideration and bona fide on the part of the purchaser. Both of
these requirements had to be present. This is still the recognized
meaning of the Statute. Reehling v. Boyer, 94 Pa. 316.
Applying these principles to the facts alleged in this bill, we
see that so far as the consideration was concerned, Harrington's title
could not be attacked. The consideration was $5000 which, it is admitted, was the full value of the farm. The question therefore presents itself whether from Harrington's knowledge 6f Jefferson's intention to withdraw the farm from the reach of his creditors we can
attribute to him the lack of such bona fides as will render the conveyance void.
There are a great many decisions in this State on the question
of bona fides, and the Courts have advanced a great many conditions
which must exist one way or another; but they have almost uniformly held that a bona fide purchaser is not affected by a fraudulent
intent of which he had no notice. This is true in regard to personalty as well as realty, and has been held to be the law in a vast number of cases. Purd. Sup. page 6155. Another line of decisions holds
that the transaction will be deemed fraudulent though made for a
valuable consideration where the intent to defraud, hinder or delay
creditors exists on the part of the vendor, and the purchaser does
not show ignorance thereof.
From these decisions we can readily see that if the purchaser
vctually knew that his grantor was conveying the land in order to
defraud his creditors, he would be judged to have participated in the
fraud whether he really intended doing so or not; and as against the
creditors, his title would be absolutely void. In fact, we find that the
Courts have so decided. In Covanhovan v. Hurt, 21 Pa. 495, the following rule was stated by Chief Justice Black: "If a debtor, with the
purpose to cheat his creditors, converts his land into money, because
money is more easily shuffled out of sight than land, he, of course,
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commits gross fraud. If his object in making the sale is known to
the purchaser, and he nevertheless aids and assists in executing it,
his title is worthless as against creditors, though he may have paid
a full price."
Referring to the bill we see that Harrington had knowledge of
Jefferson's intention to withdraw the farm from the reach of his creditors, and, although it clearly appears that he had no intention to assist Jefferson in so doing, nevertheless, we think that by his knowledge of this fraudulent intention and his subsequent purchase of the
land thereunder, he has placed himself within the exception of the
cited authorities, and that by so doing, his title is such as will avail
him nothing in this suit.
Although it will in all probability work a hardship on the respondent to take from him his title to and interest in the land of
Jefferson without returning to him the consideration which he paid
for the same, nevertheless, we fail to see how in the face of all the
precedent authority on the subject the Court can do otherwise.
We therefore decree that the conveyance from Jefferson to
Harrington was void as against the creditors of the former, and that
Harrington deliver up his deed for cancellation.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Three questions are presented for determination: (1) Was the
conveyance voidable as against Harrington? (2) Was the conveyance voidable at the instance of Roper? (3) Was the conveyance
voidable in a court of equity?
(1) This question must be answered in the affirmative. "A
purchase made by one not a creditor is fraudulent and void as against
creditors, where it is made with notice of the fraudulent intent of the
seller notwithstanding that the buyer has paid an adequate consideration.
Knowledge is equivalent to, and constitutes, participation,
where the transfer is to one not a creditor. It is not necessary that
the purchaser shall have bought with the intention of aiding the
grantor in his fraudulent design." 20 Cyc. 470; Renninger v. Spatz,
128 Pa. 524; Chester Co. v. Pugh, 241 Pa. 125.
(2) This question must be answered in the affirmative. "The
executor or administrator # * * * cannot set aside the fraudulent
act for the benefit of the heirs or next of kin. But * * * the executor
or administrator may set up the fraud and avoid the act of the decedent for the benefit of the creditors where the estate is insolvent."
Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. 495; Buehler v. Gloninger, 2 Watts
226; Skiles Ap., 110 Pa. 248; Chester Co. v. Pugh, 241 Pa. 124.
(3) This question must be answered in the affirmative. In Pennsylvania in ordinary cases a bill in equity does not lie to set aside a
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fraudulent conveyance. The remedy of the creditor is by levy of execution and sale and then contesting the title of the fraudulent vendee
ir. an action of ejectment. But where the fraudulent vendor has died
such a bill may be maintained by his executor or administrator. Chester Co. v. Pugh, 241 Pa. 124.
Affirmed.

JOHNSON'S ESTATE
Wills--Ambiguity in Designation of Legatee-Parol Evidence
Johnson's will bequeathed $2000 to "my friend Henry Abbott Milford." Among his friends was a Samuel Milford, with whom he had
constant and intimate relations. Within 5 miles of Johnson's place of
abode, there was a Henry Abbott Milford, but Johnson barely knew
of his existence and seldom spoke to him. In the distribution of his
estate, both these persons claimed the legacy.
Plessett, for the plaintiff.
Powell, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PRINCE, J. Concerning few subjects is there more confusion
in the decisions than exists in regard to the admissibility of parol
evidence to explain an ambiguity. There is confusion as to what
constitutes an ambiguity, and still more confusion as to the circumstances which must exist to justify admitting parol evidence to explain it.
Ambiguities have been divided into two classes, patent and latent ambiguities.
Lord Bacon in Circa 1597, Maxims, rule XXV,
states, "There be two sorts of ambiguities of words; the one is ambiguitas patens and the other latens. Patens is that which appears to
be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument; latens is that which seems
certain and without ambiguity, for anything that appeareth upon the
deed or instrument; but there is some collateral matter out of the
deed (here the will) that breedeth the ambiguity...........
Despite the classification, diverse views have been adopted by
courts and text book writers as to the proper distinction. The law
of eVidence now embraces Lord Bacon's view, Chaplin's view, Underhill's view, Schouler's view, and others. Hughes on Evidence, page
257.
For our purposes it will be sufficient to examine only the views
of Schouler and Underhill. Schouler on Wills (3rd ed.) 576, states,
"The two classes of cases, then, in which direct evidence dehors the
will appears admissible to show the testator's intention, are these: (1)
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Where the person or thing, the object or subject of the disposition,
is described in terms which are applicable indifferently to more than
one person or thing. (2) Where the description of the person or
thing is partly correct and partly incorrect, and the correct part
leaves something equivocal ........
Underhill on the Law of Wills, 910, states, "It is not necessary
in order that parol evidence may be received, that the description in
the will shall apply precisely and in every respect to two or more
persons or things. In some cases where the rule has been invoked,
two persons of exactly the same name, or answering precisely the
But the law requires only that the
same description, have claimed.
testamentary description shall apply to the several objects with legal
certainty, so that the mind of the court is satisfied. The description, whether by name, locality or occupation must be sufficient to
fairly satisfy the court that the testator may have meant either of
the several persons or things which are revealed by the extrinsic eviThus, if a benefit is claimed by several persons, all answerdence ....
ing the description of the will in one or more material particulars,
though none of them answer to it perfectly and accurately in every
particular, extrinsic evidence is received." In the leading case ol
Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244, (1832), Chief Justice Tindal recognizes the above two separate classes of latent ambiguities. He explains,
I...... The other class of cases is that in which the description contained in the will of the thing intended to be devised, or of the person who is intended to take, is true in part, but not true in every particular. As where an estate is devised called A, and is described as
in the occupation of B, and it is found, that though there is an estate called A, yet the whole is not in B's possession; or where an estate is devised to a person whose surname or Christian name is mistaken; or whose description is imperfect or inaccurate; ...... parol
evidence is admissible to show what estate was intended to pass, and
who was the devisee intended to take, provided there is sufficient indication of intention appearing on the face of the will to justify the
application of the evidence." The confusion is the result of the decision in the paradoxical case of Doe v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363,
(1839), which Lord Abinger decided contra to the decision in Miller
v. Travers, (supra), although he stated, "We are prepared on this
point (the point in judgment in the case of Millers v. Travers) to adhere to the authority of that case." The effect of Doe v. Hiscocks
(supra) has been, (1) To limit the admissibility of declarations of intention made by a testator to the one class of cases, "where the person or thing, the object or subject of the disposition, is described in
terms which are applicable indifferently to more than one person or
thing"; and (2) To exclude "where the description of the person or
thing is partly correct and partly incorrect, and the correct part
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leaves something equivocal." In England, while it has met with some
adverse criticism, it has been quite generally followed. In the United
States its reception has not been so hearty, nor can it be called the
American Rule. The weight of authority is against it, and in harmony with Miller v. Travers. Illinois follows Miller v. Travers on all
points. Willard v. Darrah, 168 Mo. 660, 668; Decker v. Decker, 121
Ill.
341. Professor Thayer, late of Harvard Law School, favored Doe
v. Hiscocks, while Professor Wigmore, of Northwestern Law School,
favors Miller v. Travers.
Therefore, it may be stated that the general rule is that extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify -a legatee described by an erroneous name in a will. Re Paulson, 127 Wis. 612, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
804; Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dallas 70. Henry, on evidence, page 344,
"For this purpose, facts relating to the claimants under the will,
the property claimed, the circumstances of the testator, the state of
his affections toward the object of his bounty, his family and affairs,
and his acts and declarations relating to the thing given or the person to whom it is given, are all relevant." Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts
385; Brownfield v. Brownfield, 12 Pa. 136; Wagner's Appeal, 4a Pa.
102; Washington & Lee University's Appeal, 111 Pa. 572; Wampole's
Estate, 3 Superior 414; Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa. 71; Presbyterian
Mission v. Culp, 151 Pa. 467; Bryson's Estate, 7 Superior 624; Amberson's Estate, 204 Pa. 397; Newell's Appeal, 24 Pa. 197; Kimmel
v. Wagner, 1 Walker 191; Miller's Estate, 26 Superior 443.
The above cases clearly enunciate the doctrine that evidence may
be introduced to clear away the ambiguity, but in these cases .there
has been no thing or person corresponding in all particulars with the
statement in the will. However, in the case at bar, there is a party
who answers to the name used in the will, i. e. hrenry Abbott Milford. Does this additional circumstance alter the decision? Counsel for the defendant contend that it does, and that the Statute of
Frauds prevents the introduction of extrinsic evidence, on the ground
that it would be making a will for the testator. We cannot agree to
that.
The Statute of Frauds was passed in England to prevent
frauds and not to aid frauds. To assist the defendant would be to
aid in perpetrating a fraud. Let us turn aside from the legal standpoint and inquire as to the practical side or result of a decision in
favor of the defendant. X has as an intimate friend John Henry
Smith. X makes a will, leaving a bequest to John Smith; both
claim; the question is, should John Smith recover? A perusal of the
city directory discloses the fact that there are 10 John Smiths in the
city, the existence of all being known to X. Can anyone claim that
all the John Smiths were entitled to recover, or that the one John
Smith was entitled to get the share and not the other nine Smiths?
This shows the fallacy in the defendant's argument. A MERE SIM-
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ILARITY IN NAME OR DESCRIPTION IS NOT SUFFICIENT. Evidence should be introduced to show some connecting links. Thus, in
the case of Powell v. Biddle, 2 Dallas 70, a legacy to "Samuel" was
shown to have been intended for "William" though there were persons answering to each name, as it appeared that the testator did
not know the former and usually called the latter Samuel. To the
same effect is the case in 8 Forum 17, where evidence was held admissible to correct the misnomer.
We have assumed that Henry Abbott Milford exactly corresponded to the person named in the will. But this was assumed merely for
the sake of making the decision more specific and certain. Let us now
consider the evidence.
The will states, "$2000 to my FRIEND Henry Abbott Milford."
Webster defines "friend" as 'one who entertains for another such sentiments of esteem, respect and affection, that he seeks his society
and welfare." In the case at bar, Johnson barely knew of Henry
Abbott Milford's existence, and seldom spoke to him. Certainly he
is not a friend. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has tried to
give a psychological reason for the presence of his name in the will.
We are content to state that no one is infallible. Therefore, in view
of the above expressed doctrines and cases, Samuel Stephen Milford
is the party intended to receive the bequest, and judgment in his favor is decreed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Johnson's legacy was "to my friend Henry Abbott Milford." There
was a Henry Abbott Milford, but he was not Johnson's friend.
Johnson barely knew of his existence, and seldom spoke to him. The
name corresponded with that of this individual. The description "my
friend" did not correspond with his property or quality.
There was a person who was a "friend" of the testator. His
name also was Milford. It was not Henry Abbott Milford, however,
but Samuel Stephen Milford.
Parol evidence is always necessary to identify any particular person as grantee, legatee, etc. This evidence brings into view these
two persons, revealing one as having the name adopted by the testator, but not having the relation which the words "my friend" depict. The testator is giving a considerable sum of money, $2000.
Men, dying men, do not usually give property to strangers, to persons the benefiting of whom is -not likely to be a wish. Friendship
is the motive expressed for the gift. It is impossible to believe that
Henry Abbott was the person whom the testator intended to benefit.
The testator may have known that his friend's name was Milford. He may not have as well known his Christian name. He could
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more easily be mistaken in this name, than in the assumption that he
was "my friend."
It is not even necessary to assume that he was mistaken as to
the Christian name of his friend. He may have, in the writing of the
will, confused for the moment, the name of his friend and of the
stranger. Such confusions occur.
The interpretation of wills involves the discovery of probabilities; rarely of certainties. It is improbable that Henry Abbott was
intended to receive $2000. It is not improbable that Samuel Stephewas intended to receive the legacy.- The case is similar to that of
Siegley v. Simpson et al., 73 Wash. 69, 131 Pacif. 479, the decision
of which accords with that which we have given.
Appeal dismissed.

